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Introduction

In this article, we propose a framework for evaluating the blended performance of an entire
foundation’s outlays — both grants and financial investments — by quantifying both impact
and financial returns separately, and using
them as two axes on a graph. Inspired by Harry
Markowitz’s work, which underpins modern
financial portfolio theory, this approach uses a
foundation’s existing outlays to chart its overall
blended performance by creating an “endowment-grant allocation line” (Markowitz, 1952).
This, in turn, makes it possible to evaluate
whether the blended value of impact investments could improve the foundation’s overall
performance, even if those investments generate

Key Points
•• While some foundations have put their
entire focus on impact investing, philanthropy still lacks the tools that enable such
investments to be made with the same
rigor as the best financial investments and
philanthropic grants. This reveals a more
fundamental problem: We do not currently
manage foundations as the integrated
portfolios that they are.
•• This article proposes a framework for
evaluating a foundation’s blended performance that enables both grantmaking and
endowment investing to be evaluated jointly,
and thus also allows a complete evaluation
of how impact investments could improve —
or fail to improve — overall performance.
•• The article demonstrates the framework’s
utility by using it to evaluate a set of
actual impact investments in the field of
the environment. Using this framework to
assess foundations’ performance would not
only improve fundamental performance, but
also potentially unlock vast new areas of
social entrepreneurship.

below-market financial returns and smaller
impacts than traditional grants. Fundamentally,
the framework presented here evaluates the
entire foundation as one big impact investment,
even if the foundation currently uses only the
most traditional tools of grantmaking and an
endowment focused solely on financial returns.
We have used this approach to evaluate a set
of actual impact-investment opportunities that
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 119
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There are few hotter topics in the philanthropic
world these days than impact investing. From
the White House to the World Economic Forum
to the Giving Pledge, the idea of making investments that also yield social good has received
significant attention (Rodin & Brandenburg,
2014; Brest & Born, 2013). And yet, it remains a
troubled field for most foundations and philanthropists (Daniels, 2016; Foley, 2015). While
some foundations — notably, the F.B. Heron
Foundation — have put their entire focus on
impact investing, philanthropy still lacks the
tools that enable such investments to be made
with the same rigor as the best financial investments and philanthropic grants (Miller &
Johnson, 2015; Miller & Rogers, 2014). As Antony
Bugg-Levine and Jed Emerson (2011) have
pointed out, the key challenge is to find a rigorous approach to evaluate the “blended value” of
impact investments.
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were seeking funding in 2012. First, using the
long-term average returns of a high-performing
nonprofit endowment and a high-performance
environmental grant that we had analyzed,
we created a theoretical philanthropy and
graphed its endowment-grant allocation line.
We then analyzed the promised impact and
financial returns of a set of 22 potential impact
investments related to climate change in a standardized way that also took into account the
duration of investment; with this, we were able
to rigorously evaluate each in a way that could
fairly compare dramatically different types of
investment opportunities. Significantly, when
compared to the theoretical philanthropy’s
endowment-grant allocation line, several of these
impact investments that seemed attractive individually actually would have reduced the overall
performance of the philanthropy, while others
that seemed less attractive on their own actually
would have improved the portfolio’s performance. In this way, the framework eliminates
the uncertainty of blended-value analysis and
allows the investor’s judgment to focus instead
on the most important question about any
investment, which is execution risk.

The Trouble With Impact Investing
For all the discussion about impact investing, it is a term and a field that seems to raise
more questions than answers. Foundations and
philanthropists struggle to figure out whether
impact-focused investments make sense and
what to expect from them. Should these investments avoid financial risk, or seek outsized
returns? Should they take first-loss positions in
order to catalyze the participation of traditional
investors, or would that simply be subsidizing
someone else’s return? How much of a foundation’s assets should go into “impact investments”? And there is also the issue of how to
calculate the impact of an investment — especially before you make it, which is when that
information is really useful (Brest & Born, 2013;
Bugg-Levine & Emerson 2011).
Adding to the confusion, advocates of impact
investing take widely differing positions on what
level of financial returns should be expected.
Some argue that there is an unlimited set of
120 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

opportunities that have lots of impact while
receiving market-rate returns or better — which
has the unsettling implication that we ought just
to cancel grantmaking altogether. Others use
the term “patient capital” — nicely complimenting those willing to wait a long time to get their
money back, but often ignoring how much value
even low inflation rates eat up over a decade or
two. And there is always the disturbing possibility that the social entrepreneurs pitching to you
might really be planning to sell their “social business” for millions, and see you more as a source
of low-cost capital than anything else (RoseSmith, 2016; Milligan & Schöning, 2011).
Finally, there is the very real issue of how to
make, and manage, impact investments. Most
program officers have an advocacy or public-sector background; they aren’t accustomed
to evaluating for-profit business plans. The
money managers could do so, but they won’t be
as focused on impact, and their incentives aren’t
well aligned since they usually get compensated
on the financial performance of the endowment.
For the occasional impact investment where
the impacts are huge and simply couldn’t be
achieved through a grant, the grantmakers will
likely get excited and be willing to fund it out of
their budget; in the same way, impact opportunities that really are financial home runs — beating the risk and return standards of the overall
endowment — will get done through the normal investing process. The ones in between will
either fall into a no-man’s-land or require direct
intervention from the CEO to get done (Godeke
& Burckart, 2015).
Unfortunately, this no-man’s-land is where most
impact-investment opportunities lie; even when
they have the potential for high returns, they
come with greater uncertainty. Navigating the
no-man’s-land requires a level of integration
across functions that few foundations achieve.
A potential impact investment must be evaluated on both its impact and its financial return,
funded either from the grantmaking budget or
the endowment, and managed for both aspects of
its performance.

Evaluating a Foundation’s Blended Performance

And this is a problem, because it is easy to conclude that such opportunities fail both the
impact test and the market test. For philanthropy
to embrace impact investing fully, it must find a
way to understand these opportunities in terms
of their blended value of both impact and financial return. Several efforts are underway to standardize and make transparent the impacts of
for-profit entities, which will help evaluate individual impact investments in a systematic way
(Godeke & Burckart, 2015; Miller & Johnson,
2015; Miller & Rogers, 2014; Bugg-Levine &
Emerson, 2011).

Visualizing the Foundation’s Blended
Performance to Evaluate Investments
The irony here is that the foundation itself is,
essentially, one big impact investment. A donor
puts an endowment into a foundation; in return,
he or she expects to receive both impact on the
world and the preservation of financial value to
enable future impact. Each year, the investment
team works to make financial returns, and the
grantmaking team is given a portion of those
returns to create impact. At the end of the year,
the foundation has two metrics by which it can
understand its performance: the net change
in the endowment and the impact generated.
Taken together, in terms of Bugg-Levine and
Emerson’s concept of blended value, this is its
blended return.
The fact that every foundation has a blended
return is clear every time a board decides to
spend more than its required distribution to

realize some time-sensitive impact opportunity, or to cut grantmaking to preserve capital
in times when the endowment shrinks due to
poor financial performance. Thus, a good board
instinctively manages for both financial and
impact performance, even if it sticks with the
traditional tools of pure grantmaking on the program side and financial-return-only objectives
on the endowment side. In other words, it seeks
to optimize blended value — which is to say, it
manages itself like an impact investment.
If the foundation is an impact investment, why
doesn’t the end-of-year board meeting struggle
with the same challenges as impact investments
do individually? The truth, of course, is that
foundations rarely attempt to measure themselves on a blended, quantitative basis. While
most grantmakers today present detailed metrics
for each grant, only a few foundations really evaluate their overall impact in hard numbers. Those
that do struggle to boil impact performance
down to even a few metrics (Colby, Fishman, &
Pickell, 2011). Even more, the resource-intensity
of the impact generated is almost never considered; the endowment managers have usually
left the boardroom before the discussion of the
grantmaking program has begun.
And this leaves unanswered perhaps the most
important question the board should consider
— the foundation’s blended performance. In the
corporate world, a key metric of performance
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 121
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Even with rigorous analysis, however, any
investment is good only if it improves the overall performance of the fund or firm making
the investment. Thus, for any given impact-investment opportunity, the rigorously evaluated blended value must be compared to the
rigorously evaluated blended performance of
the foundation considering it. And that is the
bigger problem — because, while foundations
generally evaluate both their endowment performances and their grants, they rarely consider the two in conjunction with one another
(Coffman & Beer, 2016).

[T]he foundation has two
metrics by which it can
understand its performance:
the net change in the
endowment and the impact
generated. Taken together,
in terms of Bugg-Levine and
Emerson’s concept of blended
value, this is its blended return.
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FIGURE 1 Visualizing Financial and Impact Returns Together
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is return on invested capital (ROIC), which is
to say, “How much money did we make taking
into account how much money we are tying up
in order to make money?” A foundation’s equivalent to ROIC would be its combined impact and
financial return, divided by the total assets in its
endowment at the beginning of the year. This
would be its blended performance.
One reason foundations don’t attempt to measure blended performance is that there would
be very little utility to the number. In theory,
if a bunch of foundations adopted the same
approach, it could serve as a comparative metric.
And while this would be useful, it wouldn’t necessarily improve performance; just as different
industries have different average ROICs, foundations in different fields or focused on different
priorities would have structurally different levels
of blended performance.
The better use of blended performance would be
to evaluate what specific investments, grants, or
impact investments would actually improve the
overall performance of the whole foundation.
122 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Most companies convert their ROIC into a “hurdle rate” for such decisions — the rate of return
specific to that company below which an investment destroys value by reducing its ROIC below
an acceptable level.
Doing this for a foundation relies on returning to the source of modern financial-portfolio
theory. In 1952, in an article that ultimately
won him a Nobel Prize, Markowitz argued
that portfolio managers were evaluating their
investments in an entirely misguided way by
focusing only on the return of an individual
asset. Instead, he argued, they should look at
the contribution that each investment made to
their overall portfolio’s performance, which had
not one metric, but two: financial return and
risk. By plotting the return and risk of each risky
asset (stocks, bonds, real estate, etc.), he argued,
an investor could find the “efficient frontier”
where any desired increase in return required
the acceptance of more risk. Further, he pointed
out that by blending this efficient portfolio of
risky assets with “risk free” treasury bonds that
returned less but had zero functional risk, an

Evaluating a Foundation’s Blended Performance

FIGURE 2 The Endowment-Grant Line
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investor could create a portfolio with any desired
level of risk along a “capital allocation line” that
connected the efficient frontier with the return
associated with the risk-free asset (Markowitz,
1952; Rubenstein, 2002).
Markowitz’s overall approach allows us to create
the same kind of benchmark for a foundation.
We start by imagining the entire foundation as
a single portfolio that makes capital outlays in
pursuit of both financial return and impact. (See
Figure 1.) The vertical (y) axis indicates the annualized financial return, and the horizontal (x) axis
indicates the impact achieved. Financial returns,
as usual, are represented as an annual percentage
or, in other words, on a per-dollar basis, because
a 10 percent return means 10 cents returned for
each dollar in the endowment each year. To be
consistent, we would show impact in standardized units of annualized impact per dollar in the
grant budget. (See Appendix A.)
In general, the endowment taken alone would
be in the top left of the graph, with (one hopes) a
10 percent to 15 percent financial return, but no

impact yielded. The grant program, considered
alone, would be at the lower right corner, yielding
impact but losing all of its investment — in other
words, a negative 100 percent financial return.
If we assume that both the investment managers and the program officers are doing their
jobs well, then each should be at the outer edge
of what is possible for their tools: the endowment team simply can’t get a sustained higher
annual return, and the grantmaking team can’t
improve its overall impact per dollar in their
current programs.
Therefore, a line between these two points on
the graph defines the combined financial and
impact performance of the foundation’s total
portfolio in any giving scenario. Using only these
two instruments, a foundation cannot achieve
results beyond this line. For example, if a foundation’s grants in a single year equaled 50 percent of its total assets, its financial return would
be just above negative 50 percent, but with a
much greater impact. (See Figure 2.) If it gave
away its endowment’s total earnings, its overall
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 123
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FIGURE 3 Plotting Impact Investments
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performance would be where the diagonal line
crosses the x-axis. The average foundation —
earning perhaps 11 percent on its endowment
and allocating 5 percent of its start-of-year assets
to grantmaking — would see an overall financial
return of approximately 6 percent and a relatively small impact return.
Thus, for a foundation using only market-rate
investments and best-in-class grants, the amount
of money allocated to grantmaking is the key
determinant of impact achieved. This “endowment-grant allocation line” is the equivalent of
Markowitz’s capital allocation line — the investor can achieve any point on the line simply by
reallocating assets, but it cannot move above or
below the line unless new asset classes emerge.
With our “endowment-grant allocation line”
defining the foundation’s overall potential performance, every other investment can be evaluated comparatively: The endowment includes
many investments, which range from financial
loss to occasional outsized returns, and the
grants include some home runs and a few that
124 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

didn’t succeed. Impact investments, generating
both kinds of return, will appear in the much
larger space between the axes. (See Figure 3.)
And this, quite clearly, demonstrates how valuecreating impact investments can be identified.
Any investment that is above and to the right of
the line generates a blend of financial and impact
returns that the current endowment-grant
structure could not achieve; it will improve the
overall performance of the foundation. Any
investment that falls below the line destroys
value; the money is better kept in the endowment’s financial portfolio and the proceeds used
to fund grants. (See Figure 4.)

Can We Really Quantify Impact?
Of course, the real challenge is how to turn this
theory into an actual, usable set of numbers that
informs an investor prior to an investment decision. The field of impact investing has expended
significant effort in ways to quantify and report
the impact associated with an investment,
such as the Impact Reporting and Investment
Standards (IRIS) tool, but these generally are not
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FIGURE 4 The Endowment-Grant Line as the Foundation’s Hurdle Rate
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designed from the outset to help select the next
one (Bhouri, 2011).

calculates a cost/benefit ratio for each potential
grant (Weinstein, 2009).

On the financial side, quantifying value is
easy because it is precisely what the concept of
“money” exists to do. In the 19th century, economist William Stanley Jevons defined money as
offering four functions: a medium of exchange,
a common measure of value, a standard of
deferred payment, and a store of value. If philanthropy had a unit of impact that could accomplish these four things, our analytical challenge
would evaporate. But a metric that could cut
across multiple fields of philanthropy eludes us
(Jevons, 1875).

Another area that lends itself to rigorous impact
quantification is environmental philanthropy,
which today is highly focused on mitigating
climate change. Directly or indirectly, climate-change philanthropy is about spending
money to keep greenhouse gases (GHGs) out
of the atmosphere. Because GHGs are fungible
across the planet, are quantifiable in a single unit
of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), and have
predictable utility across time, climate-change
philanthropy has a metric that is just as analytically powerful as money.

However, some program areas do lend themselves to quantitative impact analysis. The Robin
Hood Foundation works hard to quantify the
impact on poverty alleviation expected from
its portfolio of grants. The foundation assigns a
monetary value to the expected benefits of the
intervention’s outcomes (e.g., one additional
person graduating from high school increases
his lifetime earnings by X dollars), and then it

The key, then, is to analyze impacts with the
same rigor as one analyzes promised financial
results. And here, too, we run into a gap: we
lack the conventions that financial analysts take
for granted. In climate change, the rules developed for carbon-trading systems focus on precise
determination of “additionality,” to ensure that
the public is actually getting the GHG reductions it paid for. These are useful rules for their
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 125
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purpose, but they don’t help the ex-ante evaluation of climate-change-focused investments.
They are, in fact, more like the accounting standards used in a financial audit. Any honest investment manager will tell you that the numbers
you crunch before making an investment would
never pass an audit; they are full of uncertainties
and estimates because they are trying to predict
the future without allowing uncertainty to prevent action. They are kept within reason by a
set of conventions about how financial returns
should be estimated. Similarly, much of our legal
structure exists to ensure that financial flows do
not get double-counted: when two people claim
the same money, a lawsuit ensues. But every
grantmaker knows that many parties often claim
the same impact. So, we need not only usable
ex-ante estimates of impact, but also an approach
to determining how much of the overall impact
can be claimed by any one investor.

Sector

So, could a climate-change-focused foundation,
using avoided GHGs as its currency of impact,
evaluate an impact investment? Easily. It should
be no more difficult to model the GHG reductions expected from an investment than it is to
estimate its future revenues and costs. It should
be feasible to adopt a notional discount rate for
GHGs, on the basis that a ton of GHG reductions
today is worth more than a ton of GHG reductions 10 years from now. Just as every investment
plan has to discount expected returns based on
uncertainty in the broader market and the risk of
poor execution, it should be feasible to discount
our impact estimates to account for the risk
that circumstances might change and the risk
that our managers might fail to deliver on their
plans. Because even a huge foundation doesn’t
have unlimited resources, we will also need to
consider how much capital must be invested,
and how long it is tied up, in order to achieve the
expected amount of impact — much as an investor already considers these investment characteristics in a financial internal rate of return. And,
if a key purpose of the investment is to prove
that a new business model works so that others
adopt it (the “demonstration effect”), a real-options approach can incorporate the value of those
future impacts. Perhaps the most difficult aspect
of this would be to determine how much of the
126 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

overall GHG reductions are attributable to any
particular investment, taking into account other
players working on the same goals, other investors in the same project, and external factors that
might influence the outcome.
This sounds like a long list, but each analysis
requires only a set of reasonable rules and some
analytical legwork to get done. And we are not
aiming for auditable figures: just as the law uses
the “reasonable man” standard, we can use the
“reasonable board member” as the person we
must convince, rather than an auditor. And our
reasonable board member should be impressed;
chances are, these are far more rigorous a set of
rules than boards are accustomed to seeing used
to assess philanthropic initiatives. (See Table 1.)

So, Does It Work in Practice?
To test this approach, we modeled a set of 22
potential impact investments and three potential grants whose nonfinancial purpose was to
reduce GHG emissions, using the conventions
described above. Most of the impact investments
were active opportunities undertaking fundraising in 2012, when this research started; five
were theoretical opportunities for which no
business plan had yet emerged. The set was chosen to span a broad range of investment types,
including debt and equity, early-stage venture
capital to project finance, initiatives with easily
quantified impact and those with indirect and/
or shared impact, and with terms that range
from two to 20 years. As the end points of our
“endowment-grant benchmark line,” we used
the average 10-year financial returns of the
best-performing large university endowment
and one large GHG-related grant in which we
had been involved and for which we had detailed
cost, impact, and allocation data.
The results indicated that there is much insight
to be gained from a rigorous approach to analyzing blended value. (See Figure 5.) Each of the
potential investments identified had smart, experienced proponents whose intuition led them to
think the investments would have great impact.
But, even accounting for the fact that they were
expected to return money to the foundation,
most had such small impacts per dollar invested

Evaluating a Foundation’s Blended Performance

TABLE 1 Impact Quantification Guidelines
Issue

Establish
pro-forma
value flows.

Approach

Method

• How much impact
do we expect over
the duration of the
investment term?

• Just as a financial
analyst models expected
periodic cash flows,
model the expected
impact quantities
associated with the
same time periods.

• Create a pro-forma model of
expected impact flows, by
time period.

• How much of the
impact generated by
this investment can we
legitimately claim?

• Consider other investors
(including owners) and
capital providers: Do
they also have claim to a
portion of the impact?

• Similar to allocating
enterprise ownership based
on an investor’s capital
contribution, but expanded
to consider external
influences contributing to
the accumulation of impact,
in order to avoid doublecounting of impact claims

Determine
ownership of
value flows.

Adjust for the
uncertainty of
getting your
return.

Include the
value of potential
follow-on impact.

Determine the
“impact IRR.”

• Some impacts, such
as carbon reductions,
are less important if
made tomorrow than
the same amount of
reductions made today.

• “Time value of impact”

• Apply an appropriate discount
rate to determine the present
value of expected impact.

• Will the business plan
be executed?

• Estimate execution risk,
permanence risk, and
other types of uncertainties for each investment.

• Apply cumulative “haircuts”
to quantities of estimated
impact.

• How do we value the
fact that our purpose
is to demonstrate that
this business model is
feasible?

• Perform a real-options
analysis using likelihood
and scale of follow-on
impact.

• Develop informed scenarios
of the potential timing and
quantities of impact beyond
the investment term; assign
probabilities.

• Is this investment
better than a grant, or
than an investment that
yields greater returns
but takes longer?

• Consider how much
capital must be invested
and for how long in
order to achieve the total
estimated impact we
can claim.

• Will the product be
used as intended?
• Will the widgets work,
and how long will they
last?

• Consider how much of
the follow-on impact we
can attribute to our initial
investment.

• Calculate the quantity of
impact per dollar invested, per
year of the investment term.

The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 127
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Discount for
the time value
of impact.

• Are other impactmotivated players
involved elsewhere in the
delivery channel, or is
the investment building
on other impactdriven work, such as
regulation?

• Often, but not always, impact
flows will follow the same
expected growth trajectory as
the business itself.

Aggarwala and Frasch

FIGURE 5 Results of Analysis, With Characteristics of Selected Opportunities
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that they were really best considered only on
their financial merits. Looking more closely,
some specific opportunities surprised us. One
investment sounded great but proved to destroy
value; in retrospect, it was so capital-intensive per
unit of impact that it could not compete with the
baseline endowment-grant combination. Another
was unimpressive at first glance, but it achieved
so much financial leverage by bringing in nonimpact investors that the large quantity of impact
easily justified reduced financial returns to the
impact investor. Another took so long to realize
impact that the discount rate ate up its value.
Above all, though, our results also demonstrated
this heartening fact: a number of the opportunities we saw do have the potential to improve the
overall performance of the foundation. And some
clearly did trade off financial returns for impact,
giving the philanthropic impact investor a key
role to play. (See Appendix B.)
These results, therefore, demonstrate also the
limitations of the after-the-fact reporting formats
many impact investors use to monitor the level
of impact their investments have had. Tools such
as IRIS are useful for the auditing function, to
128 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

ensure over the long term that the field is not
selling snake oil. But they are not always useful to predict the impact of potential individual
investments. If impact investing is to compete
for capital with the traditional philanthropic
approach of earning money and then making
donations, it must adopt far more precise ways of
selecting those investments that will create value
for the foundation as a whole. Making impact
investments imprecisely and then evaluating
them rigorously will — inevitably — lead to
lackluster performance. Only when quantitative
analysis drives investments will the field’s actual
performance realize its potential.
Our results also demonstrated one additional
benefit to this kind of rigorous analysis: that
there is a huge, unexplored white space that
philanthropy can and should consider. Most of
the impact-investment opportunities we analyzed fell into two clusters: some were truly value-creating, while most clustered closely around
the profitable end of the endowment-grant
benchmark line, indicating, essentially, “business plans with some positive social benefit.”
(See Figure 6). This makes sense; while lots of

Evaluating a Foundation’s Blended Performance

FIGURE 6 Expected Financial and Impact Returns for a Set of Impact Investments,Plotted Against
the Endowment-Grant Line
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people seek proposals for grants and profitable
business plans, there is not the comparable
demand for business plans that lose some, but
not all, of their money while creating social
good. Of course, there are lots of organizations
that do good work while generating revenues
insufficient to cover their costs; think of most
arts and educational institutions that augment
revenues from tuition and ticket fees with grants
from donors. The field of social entrepreneurship would clearly benefit if philanthropist-investors were to find a way to value equity stakes
in ventures that might never make a profit but
aren’t truly charities.

Putting This Into Practice
The approach here represents a first-cut attempt
at developing a methodology that would consider an impact investment in its true context.
We are encouraged by the initial results and
what we have learned through building this
analytic model and data set. It will be necessary
to refine the methodology through the analysis
of additional climate-focused investments — to
more specifically address the riskiness of financial returns (through standardized assumptions

by asset class and business stage), as well as
more consistently consider and account for the
impact upside of the demonstration affect, a
key rationale behind many impact investments
(which can be done through a real-options-style
analysis). Further, just as every investment firm
develops its own models to reflect its beliefs,
preferences, and risk tolerance, any impact
investor will need to tailor an approach such
as this to its own situation and purpose in the
selection of opportunities.
Even when the framework is refined, acting on
the opportunities it identifies will still require
management finesse, because the traditional
separation of a foundation’s investment and
program teams provides no obvious place from
which to analyze or manage investments seeking both financial and impact returns. Asking
these two groups to work together under
existing structures seems destined for failure
— especially if the investment managers are
compensated on financial performance alone
and the program officers lack financial experience. Alternatively, a separate impact-investing
team would need not only to attract the best
The Foundation Review // 2017 Vol 9:2 129
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There will be challenges
inherent in a transition
from traditional foundation
operations to this unified
analytic and investment
approach. But this framework
and our results are evidence
that it can and should be done,
and with worthwhile result.
The difficulty, and messiness,
involved in identifying and
quantifying a foundation’s
impact is the necessary price of
determining its effectiveness.
from both the program and financial sides of
the house, but also ensure that they are fully
working together and can compete fairly for
investment dollars with both the grantmaking
program and the endowment. For example, the
Heron Foundation has merged its investment
and program teams into one “capital deployment” team as it shifts its strategy to one fully
focused on impact investing (Wallace, 2013).
Our framework provides a basis on which to
solve these management challenges. A quantitative, dual return metric offers program and
financial staff a neutral, common ground that
requires each to think deeply in the terms of the
other side of the house. It provides a way for a
board of directors to determine smart allocations of money away from grants or endowment
funds and into impact investments at a scale that
matters. And it offers a basis for results-based
compensation structures that can attract money
managers into the impact-investing space, with
the right incentives.
130 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

There will be challenges inherent in a transition
from traditional foundation operations to this
unified analytic and investment approach. But
this framework and our results are evidence that
it can and should be done, and with worthwhile
result. The difficulty, and messiness, involved
in identifying and quantifying a foundation’s
impact is the necessary price of determining its
effectiveness.
This framework also provides a way to continuously evaluate and improve the performance
of the entire foundation. One could imagine
compensating all staff based on the foundation’s
combined performance, for example, helping to
break down the silos between the financial and
program staff. Recognizing the fact that each
program area will probably always have a different unit of impact, one could break the foundation’s endowment up into a separate account for
each program, and evaluate each program using
this framework — just as many corporations
evaluate performance at the business-unit level.
In such a case, fields in which impact investing
proves more effective would do more of it; fields
in which traditional grants prove more effective
would stay where they are. But in both cases,
ongoing evaluation would ensure that a foundation did not miss a change in circumstance or a
good opportunity.
Either way, the real challenge of impact investing
is a challenge to the foundation itself: Can we
think about our overall performance in a rigorous, quantitative way that incorporates both our
impact and our financial objectives? And can we
do so in a way that informs and improves our
decision-making process? If we can — and if we
are willing to act on it — getting impact investing right offers a way not only to use new tools,
but to improve the effectiveness of the foundation as a whole.
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APPENDIX A Calculating an Annual Impact Return
Financial investment decisions are usually made based on two types of return calculations: net
present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR). The NPV factors out the cost of the capital
deployed, so has the simplicity of yielding a single number that incorporates the duration of the
investment; with NPV, an investment that takes 10 years to yield a return can be compared to an
investment that returns cash to the investor in one year.
The NPV, however, is appropriate only in instances where the investor has unlimited access to
capital. By incorporating into its analysis the cost of that capital, it focuses only on the returns to the
investor deploying the funds, not the fundamental owner of the funds. Thus, its use is most often
appropriate in a corporate or project-type setting.
It is tempting to use a similar approach to evaluating impact, by assigning a dollar value to impact
a priori (e.g., $1 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent) and calculating the value of the total impact
achieved in dollar terms. However, this fails to be useful unless the philanthropist is really willing
to buy an unlimited amount of impact at that price, which is rarely the case, especially if market
mechanisms (such as carbon-trading markets) offer lower prices. In this way, it is similar to the NPV,
which implicitly assumes that access to capital is unlimited.

Sector

Investors use the IRR because it does not incorporate the cost of capital; rather, the return measured
is the total return to the holder of capital, including the rent of the capital deployed. This is appropriate both for the owner of the capital and in instances where the pool of capital is constrained, as
in an endowment or investment fund. Thus, the IRR is a more appropriate metric for foundations
because their pool of capital is limited by their endowments.
Similarly, because philanthropists are not usually open to buying unlimited amounts of impact at
a given price, we believe the IRR is a better inspiration for the quantification of impact than the
NPV. This raises a problem, however: the simplicity of the IRR as a metric is due to the fact that the
numerator (cash earned) is the same as the denominator (cash invested). When considering impact
generated per dollar invested, the numerator and denominator are, of course, different. Thus, we
reinterpret the IRR to be “annual return on cash invested,” which can come in the form either of cash
or of GHGs, measured in carbon dioxide equivalents. (See Figure 7.)

FIGURE 7 Explanation of the approach used to develop a metric for impact return comparable to
the IRR for financial return.
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APPENDIX B Results of Analysis

Project Name:

Solar Product
Company A

Expected
Annual
Financial
Return
(IRR)

Expected
Annual
Impact
Return
(CO2e, kg)

WC Loan

Actual

10

13

5,000,000

-1.9%

20.91

Preinvestment Facility
(infrastructure)

Loan

Actual

6

16

5,000,000

1.0%

22.81

Modular Green Homes

Loan
Guarantee

Actual

2

15

1,500,000

1.61%

0.80

Clean Cookstoves
(with credit revenue)

WC Loan

Actual

5

6

1,000,000

1.88%

-

Solar Product
Company B

WC Loan

Actual

2

5

2,000,000

2.45%

22.53

Loan Fund

Actual

5

15

2,500,000

4.10%

26.62

EE Finance Fund*
Truck Retrofit Fund

Actual

7

25

3,000,000

4.34%

7.57

Fund

Actual

11

11

2,000,000

8.14%

0.38

REDD Fund B (with
partial credit revenue)

Fund

Hypothetical

20

20

75,000,000

8.63%

26.41

Tax Equity

Actual

15

20

50,000,000

8.68%

1.46

Diesel Replacement

Project
Equity

Actual

10

15

1,000,000

9.36%

0.22

EE Project Equity *

Project
Equity

Hypothetical

10

15

345,000

10.22%

2.01

Tax Equity

Actual

6

20

50,000,000

12.06%

2.23

Fund

Actual

10

10

10,000,000

12.80%

-

Tax Equity Distributed
Solar
REDD Fund A
(with credit revenue)
Biomass Power Plant

Equity

Actual

16

16

950,000

13.14%

5.03

EE Project Company *

Equity

Hypothetical

7

14

750,000

13.94%

0.73

Ranchland Restoration
Fund B

Project
Equity

Actual

6

6

7,745,472

15.27%

0.01

Mezzanine
Loan

Actual

2

5

2,000,000

15.40%

22.71

Shipping Technology
Series B

Equity

Actual

8

18

5,000,000

17.24%

18.07

NYC Taxi Conversion

Loan
Fund

Hypothetical

12

12

26,785,200

18.92%

1.96

LA Taxi Conversion

Loan
Fund

Hypothetical

14

14

12,183,730

21.83%

2.58

Enery Emissions
Reduction Company

Equity

Actual

10

10

1,500,000

28.08%

18.71

Conservation
TIllage Project

Grant

Actual

5

10

400,000

-100.0%

19.98

REDD Fund A (with
no credit revenue)

Grant

Hypothetical

5

28

10,000,000

-100.0%

2.23

Climate Advocacy
Grant

Grant

Actual

4

20

50,000,000

-100.0%

38.56

Solar Product
Company B

EE = energy efficiency.
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Sector

WC Loan

Ranchland Restoration
Fund A

Tax Equity Wind

*

Type

Investment
Impact Investment
Actual or
Term
Duration
Size
Hypothetical
(years)

